


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SLORC Chairman Gives Guidelines for Development

93SE0185A Rangoon *THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR*
in English 2 May 93 p 1

[Text] Yangon, 1 May—National Development Depends on Uprightness, Efficiency of Service Personnel

Senior General Than Shwe Gives Guidelines for Regional Development in Rakhine State

State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] Chairman Defence Services Commander-in-Chief Senior General Than Shwe and Madame Than Shwe Daw Kyaing Kyaing yesterday continued their visit in Rakhine State. During their visit, Senior General Than Shwe gave guidelines to regional officials on regional development including transportation and agriculture sectors.

At Rammawady Yeiktha of Western Command, Senior General Than Shwe and Daw Kyaing Kyaing cordially greeted officers and their wives of Western Command and Danyawaddy Naval Regional Command Headquarters and presented gifts to them for regiments and units.

State Law and Order Restoration Council Secretary-2 Lt-Gen Tin Oo and Ministers, who accompanied the Senior General, met in the Western Command meeting hall with Law and Order Restoration Council chairmen at different levels and departmental officials.

Uprightness, Efficiency

The Secretary-2, in his address, said national development depends on the uprightness and efficiency of service personnel while Law and Order Restoration Councils at different levels, as administration organs, have to supervise service personnel's tasks.

He stressed coordination to be made among departments for expediting the execution of tasks despite differences in the nature of their work.

He also urged Law and Order Restoration Councils to make coordinations and provide assistance to departments without affiliation to one's own department or locality.

For the public to have credibility and confidence in the administrative machinery, it is dependent on service personnel who should strive with efficiency and integrity and without indulging in corrupt practices, he said.

Minister for Home Affairs Lt-Gen Mya Thinn, Minister for Transport Lt-Gen Thein Win, Minister for Information Brig-Gen Myo Thant, Minister for Communications, Posts and Telegraphs U Soe Tha, Minister for Cooperatives U Than Aung and Minister for Prime Minister's Office Brig-Gen Lun Maung explained to the officials Ministry-wise tasks for regional development.

After the meeting, Senior General Than Shwe greeted the local officials and told them to strive for the development of their regions.

In Buthidaung

The Senior General and party were greeted on arrival at Buthidaung by Western Command Base Tactical Operations Command Officiating Commander Lt-Col Thura Maung Ni and local officials.

In Aungmingala Hall of the local regiment, the Secretary-2 and Ministers discussed requirements for regional development with departmental officials of Buthidaung, Maungtaw and Rathedaung Townships.

The Senior General told them to complete the construction of motor roads as soon as possible, and gave guidelines on regional development.

In Kyauktaw

In Kyauktaw, Senior General Than Shwe and party paid homage at Thekkya Marazein Maha Muni Buddha Image and offered flowers and lights. Senior General Than Shwe offered shwe salwedaw (gold crossed sash) to the image. The salwedaw has been made with cash donations by Konlon Sayadaw.

The Senior General and party then poured libation water for the donation and received Five Precepts from member of State Central Working Committee of Sangha Myoma Shwe Kyaung Sayadaw Maha Ganthavacaka Bhaddanta Revata who explained the advantages usually gained from the deed of donating gold sash. Alms were offered to Rakhine State Working Committee of Sangha member Sayadaw Bhaddanta Kavinda and Township Sangha Nayaka Committee Chairman Sahadaw Bhaddanta Indamala.

The Senior General contributed cash donations for general renovation of the pagoda which houses the sacred image. The Secretary-2 also handed over collectively donated cash to Pagoda Board of Trustees.

The Secretary-2 and Ministers also met departmental officials of Kyauktaw, Mrauk-Oo and Minbya Townships. Senior General Than Shwe greeted them and advised them to extend multiple cropping of paddy and to cultivate other crops if paddy does not thrive well in the region.

The Senior General presented gifts for regiments and units.

In Ann

Senior General Than Shwe and party were welcomed on arrival at Ann Township by Magwe Division Law and Order Restoration Council Chairman Col Maung Par and other officials.

The Senior General inspected local regiments.

BURMA

Energy Minister Visits Gas Production Site
*93SE0184A Rangoon THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR
in English 6 May 93 p 1*

[Text] Yangon, 5 May—Minister for Energy U Khin Maung Thein, accompanied by officials concerned, this afternoon inspected the Ngalarachaung Test-well No 1 where natural gas is successfully produced, lauded the service personnel and presented gifts to them.

Minister U Khin Maung Thein and party arrived at the Ahpyauk Oilfield in Zalun Township and were welcomed by Zalun Township Law and Order Restoration Council Chairman U Oo Khaing, local people and personnel of the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise.

The Minister and party inspected the drilling work carried out at Ahpyauk natural gas well No 3 and were briefed by the officials concerned. The Minister gave necessary instructions and proceeded to gas wells No 2 and No 1 and inspected the production and distribution of natural gas.

The Minister and party visited Lawka Marazein Man-aungmyin Pagoda and paid obeisance at the pagoda and presented offertories to member Sayadaws of Township Working Committee of Sangha.

The Minister later had discussions with local people and explained to them regional development measures being carried out in Ahpyauk and the surrounding villages of Ahpyauk Oilfield.

Next, the Minister inspected the successful production of natural gas at Ngalarachaung Test-well No 1. He lauded the service personnel and presented gifts of honour to them. The Minister, speaking on the occasion said that about 30 million cubic feet of natural gas was being produced daily from the three test-wells and it was estimated that about 10 million cubic feet of natural gas would be produced daily from the Test-well No 3 where drilling work was in progress.

He disclosed that a total of about 40 million cubic feet of natural gas would be produced daily from Ahpyauk Oilfield in May. He said that the natural gas thus obtained would be used in producing electric power, in distributing to industries and in stepping up the production of chemical fertilizer. He mentioned that three or four more oil wells would be drilled in Ahpyauk Oilfield area.

The Minister also explained that measures were taken to bring natural gas and crude oil from offshore area speedily to onshore area and hence there would be a steady supply of natural gas without any disruption.

The Minister and party arrived back in Yangon in the evening.

Chakraphong Discusses Human Rights Issues

93SE0124A Phnom Penh PRACHEACHON
in Cambodian 15, 16, 17 Dec 93

[“Recent” Speech by SOC [State of Cambodia] CPP [Cambodian People’s Party] Central Committee Member Norodom Chakrapong: “Are There Two Kinds of Human Rights?”]

[15 Dec pp 1-3]

[Text] At the present time, it is usually said that the question of human rights is a very important matter. Do the rights of each person affect human rights? A majority of us speak the same language, however, there are some who interpret human rights who don’t understand anything especially in Cambodia. I am very sad about the past when the Khmer Rouge regime killed our people in 1975—a regime of three years, eight months, and 20 days. This was a most serious violation of human rights and the world never suffered as did our people. And I am saddened by some politicians forgetting or not even considering this bitter past of our country and who seem now to want to forget those problems. I understand and the State of Cambodia (SOC) and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) understand that problem so that we can bring about national reconciliation. With this in mind, we agreed to forget the past in order to solve the problems in Cambodia by the decision of 23 October 1991. But, did our forgetting about the Khmer Rouge or Democratic Kampuchea stop the killing after the accords? According to the observations of all our people, both international and domestic opinion, how can our people have truth and justice, freedom and human rights, and life after the accords if the Khmer Rouge do not honor them at all? For example, after the accords, the Khmer Rouge continued to violate the accords. The Khmer Rouge are especially active in rural areas such as Kompong Thom, Preah Vihear, Battambang, and Kampot Provinces, in Sihanoukville, in Kompong Cham Province, etc. where they shoot, rob, and oppress our people. Our people, because of Khmer Rouge violations and shootings, have been forced to leave their villages and abandon their meager belongings; many have suffered death and injury and become war refugees. The UN and some associations provide them with small gifts, but the burden of support for these war refugees falls on the SOC.

I am sad because not a single party has spoken about human rights at all. Don’t the people, whether they live in the countryside or in towns, have the right to live as usual? In terms of rights, they are like everyone else; however, because of the oppression and shootings by the Khmer Rouge they have had to flee their homes. The other factions, which say that they are protecting human rights, H.E. [His Excellency] Son Sann and FUNCINPEC [National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia] especially make appeals about human rights, we and the people have never heard either of these two make any

accusation against Democratic Kampuchea at all. I’m also puzzled that the U.N. authorities hardly dare to mention human rights when thousands of families were driven from their homes, little thatch or wooden houses, and were forced to flee as war refugees. No one dares make an appeal and they remain silent as if they do not understand or hear. If there is any problem, and sometimes they have their own problems, both of these parties or other parties make appeals about human rights and human rights organizations seem to be very active in taking up the problems of one or two people, the majority of which are not really true, and making them out to be important matters. As for our poor people, there are a few out in the boondocks and there are violations—killings and injuries, and neither the human rights organizations nor the parties have heard any appeal. Is human rights of two kinds? I say that laws are created for everyone and especially considering the majority of the hapless victims after the accords. Specifically, I appeal to humanitarian organizations, human rights organizations to please have two eyes or two ears and have the courage to condemn if you see clear indications of violations against the thousands of families; to continue not daring to condemn is a very serious matter. In its own right, it is an organization that protects human rights and especially other parties which demand human rights because our people need rights and an existence where there are secure human rights, and they have the right to have political parties. Since thousands of families who live under the control of the SOC who have agreed to live with the SOC and the people’s party, some humanitarian organizations do not pay attention to other parties and ignore serious violation against human rights. Therefore I again appeal to human rights organizations in the State of Cambodia; the SOC has signed the accords on human rights and other parties also, but I plead for the implementation of the accords so that there may be real justice because if there were so many violation in a free democracy it would make people pay more attention; some humanitarian organizations and some parties talk about the SOC’s violations not allowing freedom to these people or those people. The immediate complaint is whether humanitarian organizations or UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] consider that complaint as the most important. I understand the complaint, but we must understand both the complainant and the complainee in order to be fair and have equal rights. A majority understand and spokesmen for the UN and UNTAC who are in Cambodia have gone public before trying to understand both sides. Usually one should investigate a complaint to determine its validity, and then speak out. But the UN and UNTAC seem to be in Cambodia especially in order to hear complaints from both Son Sann’s party and FUNCINPEC; UNTAC is the spokesman for those authorities who publish first and ask questions and conduct investigations later and many factions say that this is not the truth. If it is not true, the honor and reputation of the people’s party and the SOC have been ruined throughout the world. This was a great ... I am very sorry for this great injustice to the SOC and

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the people's party where both international opinion and UNTAC itself recognize that the SOC and the people's party respect the Paris accords of 23 October 1991.

[16 Dec p 2]

Another problem which I would like to address is the problem of FUNCINPEC. In their propaganda they say that if FUNCINPEC wins, it will give power to the prince, the chief of state. First of all, I do not understand and especially do not understand why UNTAC does not respect this and why there is no careful investigation of that party regarding the problem of the various party symbols. Within the Supreme National Council (SNC) we have even issued documents forbidding the use of two symbols: the symbol of Angkor Wat used by the people's party has been changed to the symbol of an angel. Previously, we used the symbol of Angkor Wat as the symbol of the people's party and we agreed to respect the accords even though that symbol had been used for many years. We agreed to change it to a different symbol, an angel. As for FUNCINPEC, UNTAC has forbidden the use of a picture of two Angkors and more importantly a picture of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. UNTAC excuses itself; it seems that the eye is blind and does not know or see; it pretends not to see and pretends not to hear. However, the leaflets of FUNCINPEC still use the picture of Prince Sihanouk. This is a violation of the accords and in the joint agreement not to use the symbols. But, at the present time, they are still using the royal picture. So, FUNCINPEC has not respected ... and UNTAC has not been fair and forced them to stop.

Second, that party uses the royal picture as a propaganda tool and tricks the people into believing that it is the prince's party.

If we love the prince, Samdech Eou, he has said time and again that he absolutely does not have a party. He is the father of all the people in the country. This means that he is the father of all the parties in Cambodia. And they spread propaganda to our people that, if their party wins, if FUNCINPEC wins, it will give power to the prince, so that he can lead. I am also surprised by this; since the prince made a statement that (1) he is not the head of the party and (2) if the voting in the party is equal to the general voting he will not be a candidate for president. If that party says that if it votes and wins it will give power to the prince, how can it do this if the prince is not a candidate for president? And, if the FUNCINPEC Party says that it really loves the prince, we must take a look at history. History shows the bitterness of more than 20 years of war; it is most bitter because during the period of popular socialism, the National Assembly gave power to the prince. After King Suramarit died, our National Assembly, during popular socialism, voted to make the prince the chief of state. But, on 18 March 1970, the National Assembly used the pretext that since it had given the prince power, it had the right to take it away from him. Did that party and our people think about the possibility of a great catastrophe in our future?

Regarding the second problem, I would appeal to FUNCINPEC to be fair and logical and keep Samdech Eou as an object of respect despite the fact that we believe they need the influence of the prince in order to deceive the people and gain power. Why did they change back to give power to the prince? I don't understand them then, do they want to get power from the prince, if they don't want power from the prince, they should not use the prince's picture as a propaganda symbol. It is an important matter and to act like this is wrong. Do we who want power use the influence of the prince and say that we will give the power to the prince. This would seem to be mocking the people. All of us need the prince to come and lead us. We need the protection of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Therefore we ourselves are grateful to the prince, but to say that we will give him power if we win the elections as a gesture of our gratitude to him is excessive. We all need his protection. Recently there have been accusations, and I am not very clear about this, and the propagandists of FUNCINPEC have accused me of joining the people's party as a strategy of FUNCINPEC because at the end I will return to FUNCINPEC. This is a trick.

Today, the 9th of December 1992, I tell all of you, a majority of whom know me, that I never speak with two tongues because anyone who knows me knows that I am a former military officer not a politician forced by circumstances to come and serve our people. My joining the people's party, as I have said before, is because I saw that, in spite of its weaknesses, the weaknesses of the people's party are insignificant compared to the help it gives to the people and rescuing them from the genocidal regime. As a person I cannot forget. I joined the people's party and am a member of the SOC because I consider that the goal of 23 October is national reconciliation. If I could have formed another party or stayed in FUNCINPEC, why am I not in FUNCINPEC. I have explained that I joined because of the prince not for any person or ideology. I joined because of the prince whom we all respect and he is my father. After he left FUNCINPEC to become the Father of the Nation, I had no further role in FUNCINPEC. Since I had joined because of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, I had the right and freedom to leave and look for another party which was sympathetic to my politics. For this reason, I sought out the people's party. Because those propagandists had also deceived our people it is a strategy of FUNCINPEC in order to infiltrate as a fifth column. First of all, I personally, am only one voice; secondly, if the royal family acted like this it would affect the honor of the family. In my name, as a member of the royal family, I must protect the honor of the family and do whatever is necessary to be honest, truthful, and clear to the people or to anyone. I either do something or not. If I join a party, I really join it. I don't straddle the fence with one foot on either side. This is an honor for me personally and I realize that it is an honor for the royal family because it is the truth.

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[17 Dec pp 1-3]

Recently, the third matter was the matter of the oppression; they accused the SOC and the people's party about the neutral climate in Cambodia because they said that both the Armed Forces and the police of the SOC or the provincial infrastructure had been oppressing the other parties and were carrying out subversion also in order to suppress the other parties. I am astonished at this also. If the SOC were really doing as it is claimed, it would not be necessary to do anything more. We only ask for proof, precise proof, the accords are legal and there is no one who can blame us. The Paris Accords state that each faction must implement the accords equally. But, for more than a year, from 23 October until December 1992—a year and a month—have all the factions, especially the Khmer Rouge, implemented the accords equally? The Khmer Rouge have not implemented them at all from the very beginning. Neither FUNCINPEC nor the party of H.E. Son Sann have protested at all that the Khmer Rouge do not respect the accords. But if we say no, now they say that we must implement the accords equally but if they are not equal we cannot implement them. At the present time don't all the parties have the right to come to Phnom Penh to propagandize, carry out subversion, distribute newspapers, have secret meetings as they wish, to propagandize anywhere they wish? How is this? And at present, they have opened headquarters in each province and in every region and every district. I am very saddened not only because a party will accuse the UN authorities—i.e. UNTAC—but because they will then accuse the SOC and ask the SOC to create a neutral atmosphere. I wonder how we can create the quality of neutrality. If we are talking about quarrels or some headquarters ... the explosion of bombs, can we see how the bomb explosion came about? An internal quarrel? A power struggle? Or what? According to accurate information, many factions are involved in internal quarrels and power struggles. The parties make campaign promises that if they win this person will become district chief. There are only so many districts and they promise to make each one a district chief so one district may have six district chiefs. Therefore, each one of these promises causes conflicts.

Sometimes there are robbers. I would like to ask the UN because most of them have come from countries which have advanced civilizations, freedom, and democracy, but can all these countries prevent robberies? To use robbery or murder and quarreling back and forth as a policy, as an excuse for a policy, seems to be somewhat unfair. I would like to state that before speaking out, before making any accusations, I have spoken with the chief of the UNTAC police, the general met with him and he said that the complaint of the various parties is that the SOC is repressing them; I said that you must listen to all these complaints, but I would ask UNTAC to listen to us also and conduct an investigation in order to find out the truth and, if the SOC is really at fault, we will take measures against our cadre or our administration in order to punish them according to the crimes they have committed or to remove them from their positions.

What more must the SOC do in order to surpass countries such as the U.S. or France who say that they are democratic countries; what can be done? If these countries would only do as I request. I would like to further request right here, do the other countries have murders and robberies? Yes, there are very many in the U.S., many in France, and there are many in whatever country.

Are those robberies to be construed as oppression by the government which is in power? If the robberies, any robber ... if we cite statistics, in the U.S., France, or some other country ... I say this because, I know those two countries best of all, whether in England or whatever country ... if we cite statistics a great many die because of robberies or die because of murder in some internal quarrel. Can we accuse that country or government of political oppression? Please, all of you, the majority of whom have come to form a party, say that I am an intellectual used to living in and wanting to have a free democracy like that in the U.S. or in France, how about all these people not to mention that and the UN, why don't they consider that? We are the ones in danger. Our cadre, for example, your wives, former Prime Ministers Chan Si or Mr. Keo Prasat, or someone in Koh Kong, it is true that our high level cadre have been robbed, robbed in their homes, all of them. Why? The robberies, in whatever district, our police have made arrests; we have arrested many, but as soon as we arrest a lot, some humanitarian organization comes along and says, no, that's not enough; you must release them. After being released that robber goes and kills our police. Our police are in danger because the humanitarian organizations make us release them first. Why? Yesterday the faction of H.E. Son Sann said that, if the SOC had robbers, it should find a new excuse to create a four party police force so therefore, if there is no ability to maintain security for the people, we should create a four party police force. I would like to remind H.E. Son Sann and the other factions when you all held power, particularly during previous years in the camps, I'd like to have those camp people come and ask whether Site 2 or Site B, or any camp, the administrative power at that time, Site 2 was controlled by H.E. Son Sann, was he able to ensure security in that small area? There were robberies, murders, rapes—was there security for the people in that camp? A small group is unable to do this, so now it is clear; now, I would like to ask for the creation of a four party police force, if our government is not able to maintain security.

We have spoken about the matter of statistics; please don't forget that our SOC controls 90 per cent of the country, and if we look at robberies or any of the thieves; if we compare it with the camps which at that time were under the control of Mr. Son Sann, it was less and the U.S. does not suppress robbery and in any country whatsoever the rate has not yet been reduced to zero. Can we blame the U.S. Government or the French Government that they do not have the ability or the jurisdiction? I would like to appeal for justice and truth do not

take a small incident somewhere and make it into a major matter. I beg you to truly respect the Paris Accords. We have respected the accords—please, you others, if you are truly good people as you say those different parties are not really different parties and after the accords they divided into five or four or three parties if there is true unity. I would ask all you dear respected brothers and sisters, today, I am trying to interpret this not to pick a fight, only to interpret the truth and now I ask you all to consider the party members. I do not say the leaders, because the leaders think only of power. But we ask you to think only about the present; what is the danger in the present and in the future. This danger, if we are not careful, the regime which we all hate, the genocidal regime can return. The Khmer Rouge are very active, especially in Kompong Thom and other regions—Battambang, Kompong Speu—so that they are working to intimidate because they know that if the violations or the warfare does not allow them to defeat the SOC then they will wage psychological warfare in order to make our people and international friends ... they say that they wage a psychological war in order to break our nerve. This is precisely the greatest catastrophe and the other parties are playing dangerous games; they do not dare accuse the Khmer Rouge. They only accuse the SOC which has made its political position clear in every way. I only ask for one thing, to explain clearly ... one country asked me if the Khmer Rouge did not implement the accords, why had they signed them in Paris. I said that was not difficult; now we can guess that if the Khmer Rouge had not signed the accords, they would lose because they would be outside the arena and would be condemned by the world and by Cambodia.

If the Khmer Rouge took part in the accords, first in the SNC and second—we can cite statistics and see. Weren't the Khmer Rouge, before they took part in the accords, limited to some regions, especially Pailin and a few regions of Kompong Thom? But the Khmer Rouge came officially into Phnom Penh or anywhere they wanted and created disturbances without being arrested officially. And second, military gain because the UNTAC forces do not dare deploy and the Khmer Rouge carry more and more ammunition into areas where they can go that were formerly denied them. So, the Khmer Rouge gain everything. This, about the matter of external gains; there was no condemnation so that now when the UN does condemn them, there is no one to carry the condemnation out. Therefore, the Khmer Rouge are still stirring things up, but if it were only the usual kind of agitation it would not matter. But this kind of agitation ... please do not forget that the prince has said that the Khmer Rouge have only one goal, to seize power by armed means. No one knows the Khmer Rouge military strategy better than the prince and no one knows the Khmer better than

another Khmer like the prince. If he says that the Khmer Rouge have only a single goal to seize power by force, then it is clear that it is so, and we see now what he has said. The Khmer Rouge expansion and sending of troops to hold areas which they have never entered, but now can thanks to UNTAC which has tied our hands and not allowed us to go anywhere the Khmer Rouge have entered. So now, in order to protect the people we have responded to UNTAC which said that we had joined the Khmer Rouge. I am surprised that the UN, which has usually been fair, should suddenly take our answer in order to defend ourselves and put us together with the Khmer Rouge. I say that the UN has changed the truth again; is there no justice?

I would like to appeal to the UN and especially to the authorities here to please be fair, take some responsibility, and I would ask our people to understand before the end of the speech. They say that they have come to solve Cambodia's problem, that \$2,000 million has been used in order to solve Cambodia's problem and I responded that the SOC had not received any of this nor had any of it reached our people. This \$2,000 million represents the specific expenses of UNTAC in Cambodia. So, they spend for themselves and their employees, but nothing reaches the Cambodians. Now the SOC is working alone, striving alone with great effort from the people, the state, and the party; this is the truth.

Before I conclude, I would like to appeal once again for all of the parties to be just and especially to all the parties which used to live in developed countries like the U.S. or France, in any place where there is murder or in any place where there is robbery, but do not take the occasion as that event, that is where are the four parties? First of all there are not four factions, [after] the accords there are only three factions. Secondly, if we are talking about three factions, they are in one faction there which has united FUNCINPEC, Son Sann, with the Khmer Rouge not yet really carried out the accords. I encourage the Khmer Rouge to follow the accords clearly. I don't care about this—because I ask you to speak only the truth so that our people will not suffer. By doing this we have not yet succeeded; the Khmer Rouge do not respect the accords. At the present time, the Khmer Rouge have infiltrated every place. So I ask you all to be steadfast, cooperate with the people's party and the SOC to protect human rights so that the genocidal regime will not return, guard the freedom which we all enjoy now not like before in order to protect security and human rights. Please ponder this matter. We must especially do whatever is necessary so that Prince Norodom Sihanouk becomes chief of state, not like the other parties say and wait until we vote then give him that power; we must, if we love the prince, vote for president before the general elections, the people all over the country must vote for Prince Norodom Sihanouk. That is the right way to give him real power.

ECONOMIC

President Orders Aid Plans for Poor Villages

93SE0183A Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian
14 May 93 pp 1, 11

[Text] Jakarta (KOMPAS)—President Suharto has tasked the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) with formulating special INPRES (Presidential instructions) aid for poor villages beginning in fiscal 1994-95. This INPRES aid will be in addition to the current INPRES Village Assistance, which provides 4.5 million rupiah annually for each village.

This was revealed by Ginandjar Kartasasmita, state minister of national development planning/chairman of BAPPENAS, who with Azwar Rasyid, chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), called on President Suharto at the Bina Graha on Thursday, 13 May. The president had earlier instructed them to jointly formulate criteria for categorizing villages as poor.

"There will be a special INPRES, with a name yet to be chosen, for villages categorized as poor according to BPS data," Ginandjar said. Under BPS plans, it will not finalize new data on poor villages until the end of this year.

After each poor village has received INPRES aid, it will be evaluated as to whether or not it still needs its help. "This is consistent with the president's desire that existing programs be continued and that efforts to eradicate poverty must be coherent and truly direct to poor areas and groups," said Ginandjar.

In this way, he added, integrated regional development will be integrated with INPRES activities. "Thus there will be no more confusion over what constitutes a poor subdistrict, whether 50 percent or 70 percent poor residents, as many people argue," Ginandjar said.

Ginandjar also said that the deadline for regional governments to make new maps of poor villages has been postponed until July. All available data will then be processed in August and September.

In October, there will be a national consultation at both central and regional government levels about development planning. Besides finalizing the formulation of REPELITA VI [Sixth Five-Year Development Plan], the meetings will complete a joint agreement on criteria for what constitutes poverty and poor areas.

"The president instructed that the map should be down to the village level and should not stop at subdistricts," Ginandjar stated. Thus, he said, there will be more maps. The map of poor villages is now by province, but it will be by district in the future. Therefore, the old data (1990) will be updated by the BPS, which uses criteria for poverty that are based on village potential. These criteria will also be strengthened by other information not now included.

The personnel doing the data gathering will be regional BPS people, for there are no trained personnel at the subdistrict level other than the statistics officers. This data will not be manipulated by regional officials.

"Do not be concerned about the work of the BPS, because it is an independent agency. Those who know the most about statistics are BPS personnel. Regardless of who makes surveys, BANGDES [Village Development], BANGDA [Regional Development], or the BPS, the statistics officers are the ones who do the work in the field," he said.

If a governor wants to make his own poverty map, Ginandjar said, he will be helped by the local BPS office, and the BPS will recheck the data.

"In this way, there will be checking and rechecking at the central government level. That is not a problem. What is done in all the provinces will be uniform. It is impossible for each to have its own criteria. That would mean confusion. There needs to be uniformity throughout Indonesia if there are to be comparisons," Ginandjar said.

Ginandjar explained that the objective of the special INPRES for poor villages will be to improve the capability of the people to resolve the poverty problem themselves. The first step will be to decide the criteria for designating poor villages, and these criteria are now being completed jointly by BAPPENAS, BPS, BANGDES, and other agencies involved. "Therefore, there will ultimately be one set of data on poverty," he declared.

Governors Need Not Fear

When asked about the possibility that governors will fear to make poverty maps, Ginandjar said they may see that the 1990 map differs from current conditions, since it is now 1993.

"Data available when I came to BAPPENAS was from 1990, and we have consistently asked that regional chiefs update this data. There is no intent to embarrass them or put anyone in an uncomfortable position," he said.

"As for reactions, we use the principle of openly discussing the poverty problem. Everyone understands this, and everyone participates in decision making. This is the healthy thing to do in this era of openness, since this is a national problem. How good it will be if we can consider it and resolve it on a national scale. The objective of submitting data is to enable people to participate in thinking about this great problem," Ginandjar said.

Azwar Rasyid said the purpose of updating the data is to save time. "The data will be used to facilitate what we are doing. Classifications may change, or there may be additional variables that will have a part in determining whether a village is poor or not," Azwar stated.

Study Carefully

Meanwhile, observers and people in the DPR [Parliament] say the special INPRES for poor villages that is to be issued must be studied carefully to ensure that implementation will reach its targets and will resolve the problem of structural poverty. The important thing is to avoid a war on poverty while the "machine" that produces poverty remains in place.

This was the opinion of Dr. Arief Budiman, graduate lecturer at Satya Wacana University in Salatiga, and H. Imam Churmen, member of DPR Commission IV from the Development Unity Faction, who were interviewed separately on Thursday night, 13 May.

According to Arief, who was contacted in Salatiga, such funding will reach its target if it is preceded with efforts to decide the activities for which the money is to be used, who will conduct them, and what the program will be. "If the funds are merely for what people lack, I do not think the money will solve the problem," he said.

Resolution of the poverty problem, he said, is not a matter of giving people what they lack but of developing the potential, whether internal or external, that exists in the community. A community sometimes possesses internal potential, such as education or expertise, but faces external obstacles that prevent development. There are many kinds of external obstacles, including limited infrastructure or land that has been condemned for public use.

"That is what I mean by the 'machine' that produces poverty. Such things as seizure of land for golf courses and banning of sidewalk vendors must also be questioned," he declared.

Imam Churmen expressed similar thoughts. If special funds for poor villages are to reach their target in an optimal way, funding must be preceded by thorough research or study of the reasons for a village's continued poverty. "The aim is to avoid being a Santa Claus who merely distributes money," he added.

According to Imam, such a survey must be directed toward the gathering of accurate data on human and natural resources possessed by a village. Conclusions can then be drawn as to an appropriate concept for resolving the problem. "If, for example, an animal husbandry business is the answer, which animal is suitable?" he said.

Arief Budiman said that at the beginning of the New Order there was poverty assistance. Each village was given 100,000 rupiah for a variety of uses. Some of them built bridges, houses of worship, etc. Such things, Arief Budiman said, were not productive. Therefore, much care must be taken to ensure that use of the money is productive and on target and that implementation is creative.

According to Arief, it is too early to say whether the special INPRES funds are good or not, because funds are merely neutral. If they are to be used to feed people who

do not have enough food, that is a good use for humanitarian funds, but it is not very beneficial. Such funds can be more beneficial if they are used to develop human resources. Thus, what we should give is incentive.

"I feel that the funds should resolve structural obstacles. Funding must be studied carefully lest it be simply lost. There must be a clear policy. The government should not be closed to a national seminar, for example, for serious discussion on dealing with poverty. To do otherwise is merely patching things. The poor get help, but the poverty production machine keeps on creating new poor people," he asserted.

Cross-Sectorial

Such a project, he added, must be implemented cross-sectorially. There should be no sectorial egotism, as though one sector is the most entitled or most important in the handling of this matter. Sectorial egotism is the beginning of failure.

Cooperation in the handling of this project needs to include community self-help groups (LSM's). He said the involvement of LSM's can provide an oversight function, for they can act as a bridge between the provider of aid and the recipients. "There must be true openness, however, lest there be mutual suspicion," he stated.

Imam Churmen believes consideration should be given to including such funds in a package with existing INPRES village aid. If necessary, funding could be linked to state-owned business enterprise (BUMN) projects that help businesses among lower economic groups and to the 8 billion rupiah in credits provided to farmers by the Department of Agriculture. "Thus, the cross-sectorial synchronization would give a greater impetus than if assistance were given separately," he said.

Even more important, according to Imam, is that all aid must reach its target if projects for eliminating poverty are to have optimal results. He said it would be very regrettable if poverty funds were constantly reduced as they pass along a lengthy chain.

Careful study must be made of where the poor are to avoid missing poor people in villages that are not poor. This applies to slum villages, fishermen, farm laborers, or those who work under critical land conditions. Careful study should then be made as to the obstacles that keep them poor. "I feel this is very important for the creation of a basis for even distribution," he declared.

Minister Says No New Monetary Actions Planned

93SE0181A Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN
in Indonesian 27 Apr 93 p 4

[Text] Jakarta, 27 Apr—The government guarantees that it will not strike any monetary blows to reduce inflation, which has reached 6.44 percent during this quarter. "We will work as hard as we can to hold down inflation but not by monetary measures."

Saleh Afiff, coordinating minister for economics, finance, and development supervision, said this in response to a reporter's question about the emergence of brisk speculative dollar purchases during the last two days.

Saleh Afiff reiterated that the government will not conduct devaluation. "There is no reason for devaluation, because macroeconomic conditions in Indonesia are quite good," he said.

He said foreign exchange reserves controlled by the government now total \$12 billion. These large reserves are enough to pay for needed imports and to protect the balance of payments. In addition, the government has also been successful in keeping the current account deficit under \$3.2 billion.

Minister of Finance Mar'e Muhammad also recently declared that Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves are quite safe and that people do not need to worry about devaluation. He explained that growth in non-oil-and-gas exports is good and that in fiscal 1992-93 those exports are expected to reach \$24.3 billion, an increase of 27.9 percent over the \$19 billion realized in fiscal 1991-92.

Saleh Afiff said further that the government will closely supervise the supply of goods in order to control inflation during the coming months.

He admitted that inflation has risen rapidly to 6.44 percent in this first quarter and said the government still must face the remaining nine months as it works to keep inflation under two digits. "I am confident that inflation can be controlled, because the macroeconomic situation is good," he declared.

Dollar Purchases

Meanwhile, dollar buying at money changers has been livelier than usual during the last three days. According to Bambang, a counter worker at PT [Limited Company] Ayumas Gunung Agung, dollar buying at his location has been lively during the last three days. In fact, the dollar has risen one point since Saturday. On Monday, PT Ayumas posted a selling price of 2,082 rupiah and a buying price of 2,062 rupiah.

He said many people may have been buying dollars to pay tuition for their children in school abroad. Bambang claimed not to know anything about the recent devaluation rumor.

Economic observer Kwik Kian Gie said devaluation rumors have recently spread again. He said there is a connection with the rise in inflation to 6.44 percent this quarter and with the rather large decline of the dollar against the yen.

In the business world, the thinking is that with deposit interest in secure banks at about 15 percent, a depositor earns only 12.75 percent after taxes. If inflation reaches 10 percent this year, a depositor will realize an interest

rate of only 2.75 percent. This is in the form of rupiah, which means the depositor must still bear the depreciation of the rupiah against the dollar, resulting in an interest rate of a negative 2.25 percent. These indicators make people run with their dollars.

Nevertheless, Kwik explained, the government still will not engage in any dollar speculation. He said the government may introduce some measure that will teach the speculators a lesson. If the government takes such an action, interest rates will soar, and speculators who sent their funds overseas will in the end hurt themselves.

No Reason

Economic observer Dr. Anwar Nasution, who was interviewed separately by PEMBARUAN, said the "rush" now taking place on the dollar is the result of fear that devaluation may occur because of high inflation in this first quarter, but he said such fear is unfounded.

He said the high inflation in the first quarter of this year has been caused by increases in prices of some commodities affected by reduced government subsidy of petroleum fuel. "These increases are merely one-time and will not continue. Thus, there is absolutely no reason for people to be busily making large-scale purchases of dollars," Anwar said.

New Status of Logistics Board Described

93SE0182A Jakarta EDITOR in Indonesian 15 May 93
pp 73, 74

[Article by Burhanuddin Abe: "The New BULOG (Logistics Board): Profit Center?"]

[Text] As it reaches its 26th birthday—on Monday, 10 May—the Logistics Board (BULOG) enters a new era. The saying, "New minister, new regulations," appears to apply to the BUMN [state-owned business enterprise] that supports food supplies. Consistent with the new departmental organization structure, BULOG, which is now under State Minister for Food Matters/Chief of BULOG Ibrahim Hasan, will function more as a kind of "holding company."

As a parent organization, BULOG will manage all food policy, whether national, regional, or international. Its subordinate units, the DOLOG's (Logistics Depots), are tasked with management and conduct of operations. They have the authority to sell or buy food supplies, as local conditions require. "In this way, we hope the DOLOG's will not be merely food procurement organizations, but can make profits and become 'profit centers,'" Ibrahim Hasan declared.

In its efforts to guarantee food supplies nationally, BULOG has, in general, several basic tasks to be performed: procure hulled and unhulled rice, distribute stocks throughout Indonesia to provide a balanced supply, import several kinds of food commodities, disburse stocks, and maintain support supplies ("buffer

stocks" and "national reserve stocks"). In short, BULOG's task is that of price stabilizer and protector of food supplies.

Food cannot be equated to rice alone. BULOG now also has authority to import and distribute soybeans, import wheat, distribute flour, and import and control the marketing of sugar. With the variety of monopolies it holds, BULOG unquestionably plays a strategic role in the national economic structure.

Because of its various licenses, BULOG theoretically should be able to garner profits amounting to billions of rupiah every year. It is for that reason that many private companies try to become its partners. BULOG was never intended to be a profit-making enterprise, however. It is always at the break-even point: no profit and no loss. Although it has a turnover of more than 3.4 trillion rupiah, BULOG is not a burden to the national budget. This is made possible by the fact that BULOG obtains Bank Indonesia Liquidity Credits (KLBI), which are distributed through government banks at interest rates that are much lower than commercial loan rates.

The ceiling for funds that BULOG may obtain from banks is 3.4 trillion rupiah per year, 50 percent of which comes from the BRI [People's Bank of Indonesia]. The government allocates an additional 1.3 trillion rupiah through the Department of Finance. "Not all of that is spent, however. If there is something that needs to be bought, the funds are used," Ibrahim Hasan said. Funds actually used by BULOG total between 2.5 trillion and 3 trillion rupiah a year.

The program now being announced by Ibrahim Hasan is appropriate for current conditions, according to Budi Hardjono, member of DPR [Parliament] Commission VI. "Rice supplies in Indonesia are relatively more extensive than they were in the days of TRITURA [Three-Fold Demand of the People], for example," he said. "Therefore, it is time to give the DOLOG's more authority. This is the same as decentralization."

In fact, Budi said, it is right for BULOG now to begin thinking about profit, as long as it does not forget its main mission as protector of rice price stability and supporter of other strategic commodities. This function is like that of PERTAMINA [National Oil and Natural Gas Company], which earns profits in addition to setting market prices. "The requirement for becoming a profit maker is an upgrading of management. To be more efficient, BULOG must be more open and transparent."

People have often raised the issue of transparency in BULOG management. BULOG is quite closed with regard to the allocation of funds obtained from fees, for example. In fact, when BULOG imported 600,000 tons of rice in 1991, it turned out that the Salim Group provided transportation facilities. "Not only was that done without bidding, but only certain people enjoyed the profits," a businessman said.

There have also been charges that BULOG too often "steals" profits through its monopoly on soybean, sugar, and flour marketing. According to Budi, it would be better if BULOG handled only rice and relinquished the other commodities to market mechanisms. "It should be done gradually, however, so that the market can fully absorb them." This appears to be consistent with the new BULOG management's concept. Ibrahim Hasan stressed that in the context of diversification his agency will [words missing as published] private sector that are interested in nonstrategic foodstuffs, particularly traditional foods.

Few Jakarta Factories Have Union Locals

*93SE0181B Jakarta SUARA PEMBARUAN
in Indonesian 19 Apr 93 p 15*

[Text] Jakarta, 19 Apr—The principle of mutual respect and appreciation sought under Pancasila [ideology of the Indonesian state] industrial relations has not been implemented consistently in Jakarta, according to an evaluation by the Jakarta DPD [Regional Executive Board] of the All-Indonesia Labor Federation (SPSI).

Salam Sumangat, S.E. [Master of Economics], chairman of the Jakarta SPSI DPD, made this statement recently in Jakarta and said that the inconsistent implementation of Pancasila industrial relations is primarily the fault of factory operators.

He said most factory operators still feel that the presence of SPSI locals merely adds problems.

He said that of the almost 3,000 plants in Jakarta, only 714 have given their employees the right to form SPSI locals.

Under conditions like this, he said, it is not surprising that workers often conduct strikes that in reality need not occur. Every such action is certain to be about wages, he said.

He cited as an example the case of a strike by 800 employees of the PT [Limited Company] Aurora Buana shoe factory at Kapuk Muara. The workers recently delegated 10 of their colleagues to bring their complaint to the Jakarta Regional Legislature. They took action because the company pays them a wage that is less than the Jakarta minimum wage of 3,000 rupiah.

According to information reaching PEMBARUAN, 500 employees of PT Leader in the Pulogadung area of East Jakarta also conducted a strike action on Friday of last week [16 April]. The workers demanded that the company increase their daily food allowance from 375 to 750 rupiah and that the company pay a monthly medical allowance of 8,000 rupiah.

Salam said these strikes would not have happened if the workers at these factories had SPSI locals. In other words, every dispute should be resolved by discussion between factory managers and worker representatives in the locals without hurting productivity.

Feels Insulted

"Frankly, as chairman of the SPSI, I feel insulted by the attitudes and behavior of factory managers who have not yet complied with the regional minimum wage of 3,000 rupiah. Even worse, they have been in noncompliance without ever sending a letter of objection to the Jakarta Regional Office of the Department of Manpower. That is a violation, and specific sanctions must be imposed," he declared.

The chairman of the Jakarta SPSI DPD, who is also a member of Commission E of the Jakarta Regional Legislature, said he doubts that the overall welfare of workers in Jakarta will improve in the next two years.

He said the welfare of workers does not depend on wage levels alone, but involves work safety and health conditions, too.

He acknowledged that the labor organization at the province level is not yet able to make an optimal defense of the interests of workers, who are being greatly harmed.

The organization, he continued, still needs the support of the executive branches of the central and regional governments to improve the welfare of workers who are paid on a daily basis, particularly in factories.

"Because our financial strength is still very limited, directors at branch, regional, and central levels are not able to give 100-percent attention. This weakness is a result of the fact that SPSI locals are not present at every labor site," he declared.

Weapons Plant To Become High Technology Center

*93SE0182B Jakarta EDITOR in Indonesian
15 May 93 p 11*

[Text] What present can you give on the 10th birthday of a weapons plant? B.J. Habibie laid the first brick for the construction of the Al Fitrah Mosque in the PT

PINDAD (Army Industrial Center Limited Company) complex on Thursday, 29 April. Thus, Minister of Research and Technology Habibie, who is also principal director of PT PINDAD, began a series of anniversary celebrations that will continue until 17 August 1995, the 50th anniversary of the Indonesian proclamation of independence.

Besides building the mosque, PINDAD will also initiate several new production units and technology transfer programs and will launch new products. PINDAD products that are to hit the international arms market include a 7.62 mm light machine gun, a CNC [expansion not given]-PINDAD automatic machine [as published], a low-voltage generator, and cranes/transport equipment. "PINDAD products are small, but that does not mean they are not technology-intensive," Habibie said.

PINDAD is different from what it was at the beginning, when its production was 100 percent for military requirements. Now, 80 percent of its products are non-military items. The weapons plant, which among other things assembles the FNC [expansion not given] assault rifle for ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces], also makes lathes, equipment for the aircraft industry, generators, and automatic industrial equipment.

In April 1993, PINDAD became a BUMN [state-owned business enterprise] under the coordination of BPPT [Agency for Study and Application of Technology], which in turn is a member of the strategic industry group (BPIS [Strategic Industry Management Board]). PINDAD now has almost 5,500 employees at two locations: Bandung, where it occupies 66 hectares; and Turen (Malang), where it has 165 hectares of land. The company also supervises small operations that are members of KOPINKRA (People's Handicraft Industry Cooperative) in Bandung. Producers under PINDAD supervision now make air rifles, decorative lamps, and a variety of metal furnishings.

MILITARY

Roles of Defense Zones, Main Force Corps Analyzed *932E0058A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Mar 93 pp 40-43*

[Article by Senior Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Thai: "Coordination Between Defense Zones and Main Force Corps in Ensuring Technical Services"]

[Text] In a war for national defense (if it ever breaks out), main force corps will fight on the grounds of provincial (or city) and district (or precinct) defense zones that have been strongly built in peacetime. Thus, in the same combat zone there always exist two systems and two modes of providing technical services: One is the system offered by the main force corps and made up of logistic and technical components (at the divisional level) or logistic and technical bases (at the military-region and corps levels), and the other is the system belonging to the local Armed Forces, which operates widely and under many different forms but is concentrated chiefly in rear areas, combat bases, and in those places where there is a large concentration of workshops, factories, enterprises... of various sizes.

Each of these two systems has its own definite strengths and limitations. Concerning the main force corps themselves, even though they may have a relatively perfect capability to provide technical services, in combat there may be exacting demands that the corps' own technical service forces cannot satisfy, especially in offensives, in mobile combat operations, or in cases their troop formations are broken up or fiercely attacked by the enemy, causing damage to large quantities of weapons that cannot be replaced in time. In the U.S. Army combat manual FM100-5, targets such as enemy warehouses and workshops are regarded as "centers of attraction" to be destroyed by concentrated firepower.

With regard to tasks, in addition to the tasks determined by the characteristics of each object of their service, the two systems have similar tasks because they share the common objective of preserving the serviceable life of equipment by organizing the repair, restoration, replacement, and supply of ammunition, equipment, and so forth.

Concerning the technological aspect, the building or repair of any parts of weapons or equipment invariably requires the application of identical or similar technical processes, no matter where these tasks are carried out: in an Army unit's workshop or in a civil factory or enterprise. Therefore, weapons parts of the same kind or designation are interchangeable, no matter who owes the weapons: the main forces or the local forces. *Viewed simply from the technological angle, interchangeability is a universal characteristic of parts or groups of parts.*

Regarding the organizational and human aspect (technical cadres, skilled workers...), this is the most complicated issue of all. It is no easy task to "interchange" technical cadres in the economic field with those in the

military field or vice versa, especially in the current multisectoral economic system. Of course, any change of personnel and transfer of technology will be done in compliance with the wartime mobilization law and, at the same time, in the spirit of mutual assistance to fulfill a common task, namely ensuring the success of combat operations.

To really bring into play the capability of main force corps and defense zones to create an aggregate strength to carry out the task of providing technical services, it is necessary to make plans for closely coordinated, joint efforts between the two systems of the two aforementioned forces in providing technical services, and to create an active and flexible method of giving technical support so as to serve both the main forces and local forces well.

The relations of coordination between the forces of defense zones and those of the main force corps are not merely "bilateral" but also "multilateral," multiform, and diverse. One of these relations is the relation between the technical service forces of local forces, militia, self-defense forces, and local civil factories and enterprises on one side and the civil factories and enterprises belonging to the central level but situated in the localities (if any) on the other side; or it is the relation among various units of the Ministry of National Defense, including units and depots of the armed branches, the central ammunition depot and regional depots (if any) of the Weapons Department, and between these units and the main force corps' technical service forces.

The relation between the technical service forces of provincial or district Armed Forces and those of main force corps, especially the main force corps of a military region, is the most favorable. This is because uniform regulations have been laid down regarding the coordination between the two forces in providing technical services under the conditions of combat operations and military campaigns. If the main force corps concerned belong to a military region, then both technical service forces will share a common command hub in that military region and fall under the management of the military region's technical department. However, the technical service capabilities of the local forces are not even. Some key provinces that had received substantial investment in the past war for national defense are better equipped than other provinces. In addition to their repair equipment, many provinces are also capable of completely assembling, with a fairly high output, some kinds of infantry weapons. Main force corps should pay attention to these uneven capabilities in order to exploit them and to plan their coordination in a rational fashion. A common fact is that local forces are people who have a good knowledge of their areas of operations and are capable of participating in preparing defense works, combat positions, roads, warehouses, yards, and repair stations and workshops for use by the main force corps

sent in from other localities. Thus, this relation of coordination can help with the carrying out of a number of tasks as follows:

1. Coordinating joint reception and provision of supplies sent to localities from the upper echelons (including the reception of maintenance materials, weapons, ammunition) within definite limits and in conformity with existing capabilities and conditions.
2. Producing some kinds of infantry weapons for their own local forces and for main force troops. In addition, the local technical service forces can supply such weapons to other localities when entrusted with this task.
3. Preparing areas of operations for the logistic and technical components or logistic and technical bases of main force troops, or coordinating with main force troops in preparing areas of operations.
4. Producing rudimentary weapons and participating and coordinating with various units in repairing weapons of different kinds according to the division of labor.
5. Joining main force units and upper-level organs in transferring weapons and ammunition production and repair technology to other components when entrusted with the task of making such transfers. Participating in giving technical training to various components as assigned and coordinated.

For the militia and self-defense forces, the funds for technical services depend on the defense budgets of localities, factories, and enterprises, with part of the funds to be provided by the provincial or district military technical sector. In wartime, the self-defense forces in some places may be organized into large-scale units such as regiments or divisions. In the past, we had to rely on state organs, factories, and enterprises in charge or upper-level military organs to ensure regular provision of technical services for these forces. Concerning these forces, in coordinating the provision of technical services, we should exploit their capabilities to produce rudimentary weapons, to build and protect warehouses, and to transport and supply ammunition to strong-point complexes, strong points, perimeter combat zones, or areas encircled or carved up by the enemy. We can also make the fullest use of the capacity of their machinery and equipment so that, if need be, we can provide a higher-than-mandatory level of maintenance service or to produce and build individual parts (in the case of factory self-defense forces).

The relations between main force corps and centrally-run factories and enterprises, or between main force corps and units of the armed branches and services, and the central depot or regional depots of the Ministry of National Defense situated in the localities must be conducted under the guidance of the upper echelons or in accordance with previously agreed-upon plans; however, attention must be paid to fresh developments in the combat zones.

During the 1980's, many centrally-operated factories in Province Q, under the joint guidance of the Ministries of National Defense and Industry, maintained and repaired various kinds of antitank and antiaircraft cannons, artillery-towing tracked vehicles, and tanks sent in by the Ministry of National Defense (from inside the same region). Therefore, those areas where there are the presence of centrally-operated factories or enterprises should study and exploit this potential to create on-the-spot capability to ensure technical services for various kinds of heavy weapons and means in wartime.

Through the surveys of the defense industrial reserves for mobilization at some defense factories and enterprises, we have clearly seen that the principal relations are those between factories and the organ in charge (The General Department of National Defense Industry and Economy), whereas the relations between these factories and the main force corps stationed in the same area, though they have been mentioned or established, still remain hazy. Therefore, aside from the initiative taken by the main force corps themselves, the assistance of various organs concerned is also needed so that these relations of coordination can be developed in conformity with the position of these corps in the territory where they are currently stationed or where they will fight in the future.

When promoting coordination between the technical service forces of main force corps' and those of localities, we should also coordinate the efforts of all parties concerned in making plans for the organization and deployment of their technical service forces and for joint actions and mutual assistance.

To formulate plans for the organization and deployment of the technical service forces in defense zones—plans that also provide for their coordination with other forces—it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge of the capability and method of organizing, deploying, and using the technical service components of the other forces, especially the main force corps. Thus, civil cadres involved in making plans for the provision of technical services of various sections and branches in the provinces and districts should also be equipped with sufficient knowledge of the task of providing technical services and logistic supplies in general, and of the methods of organizing and deploying the logistic and technical forces of military corps in particular. Conversely, commanding and technical cadres of military corps themselves must be conversant with the design and structure of the rear areas, combat bases, and the locations of service stations, workshops, factories... in the areas under the charge of military corps and their actual capability.

With the fighting method allowing main force corps to operate on the grounds of provincial or district defense zones, the technical service forces of main force corps can be deployed in appropriate positions conforming with their fighting methods and with the deployment of the

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logistic and technical forces of the defense zones. Therefore, the notion of deploying the technical service forces in accordance with combat formation—the front, the rear, the flank...—has become just a relative and transitory concept. In reality, in the deployment of these forces, there may be a technical component (or base) (which may be a principal or light component, or a depot prepared in advance) of the main forces which overlaps or is close to the area where the local technical service forces are deployed. However, whether such a component is close to the local technical service forces or not, in the plans for technical service provision we must provide for the development of relations of coordination by devising sufficient advance measures and standing prepared for all possible contingencies, and must carry out a concrete division of labor so as to assist each other, to prevent redundancy, and to guard against the failure to provide various forces with regular, uninterrupted technical services.

To promote unity, the responsible organs, including research organs and the organs in charge, should set forth common standards to prepare the necessary data for the promotion of joint actions. In the past, the General Technical Department had issued a document entitled: "The Task of Providing Technical Services in Military Campaigns," which presented tables of precomputed capability of various Army units to repair weapons, automobiles, and tanks in a 24-hour period. These tables are a basis for making plans, but they should be readjusted to conform with the current, new personnel organization. Regarding the repair capability of the forces in

provincial and district defense zones, there should also be tables of data precomputed in accordance with unified guidance to permit fast and neat coordination of actions.

With regard to the sphere of action based on the division of labor and coordination, it can be determined according to the administrative boundaries of hamlets (or mountain hamlets), villages, and districts. In addition, the division of labor should also be effected in accordance with each battle, each task, and each direction of fighting as it is anticipated.

Concerning the management of activities aimed at providing technical services in each zone, this management must be closely and uniformly linked with the combat organization, management, and command systems. When the combat command of main force corps and that of defense zones are merged into a single hub, the command of the technical service forces must also be unified accordingly. When the military activities of various components are carried out in conformity with the coordinated-action method, the technical service forces must also operate in accordance with this method. In the second case, the relations of technical service provision should be established even more closely and cemented by advance planning. At the same time, these relations should be ceaselessly adjusted and supplemented in the process of combat operations in order to bring into full play the capability of various forces, thereby creating an aggregate force in providing technical services.